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Abstract Although widely used for both security and
usability concerns, scenarios used in security design may
not necessarily inform the design of usability, and vice-
versa. One way of using scenarios to bridge security and
usability involves explicitly describing how design deci-
sions can lead to users inadvertently exploiting vulnera-
bilities to carry out their production tasks. This paper
describes how misusability cases, scenarios that describe
how design decisions may lead to usability problems sub-
sequently leading to system misuse, address this problem.
We describe the related work upon which misusability
cases are based before presenting the approach, and illus-
trating its application using a case study example. Finally,
we describe some findings from this approach that further
inform the design of usable and secure systems.
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1 Introduction
In 1994, Nielsen claimed that cost was the principle reason
why usability engineering techniques are not used in
practice [47]. While the financial costs of applying many
usability techniques have been reduced by technology
advances, other tangible and intangible costs have arisen to
take their place. Many of these costs arise because of the
expectations we increasingly place on these systems; we
expect systems to be secure, but we also expect them to be
usable. Techniques from secure software engineering and
usability engineering help reason about how effective
design decisions might be at mitigating risks or improving
the effectiveness of a user’s tasks, respectively. Yet,
developers may believe that their knowledge about user
goals and expectations negate the need for interaction
design, or their understanding of the system’s risks and
mitigating controls negates the need for any security ana-
lysis. In such cases, developers may feel security and
usability engineering approaches are useful, but they do not
believe that the pay-off justifies their cost.
Scenarios are widely used by both security and usability
professionals, but for different reasons. To usability pro-
fessionals, they describe how people use a system to carry
out activities that achieve their personal or occupational
goals. To security professionals, scenarios describe how a
system might be misused towards an attacker’s own ends.
Although scenarios are flexible enough to be used in both
contexts, an artefact from one context is not necessarily
useful in another. A scenario describing how a student
returns a borrowed book to a library may provide no more
insight into the security of a library’s loan management
system than a scenario describing how a professional
hacker might carry out a denial of service attack on the
library’s web-server provides insight into the usability of
the same system.
One way of engaging developers might be to encourage
them to consider the negative impact that their design
decisions could have on the systems they are building. A
system could go wrong in many different ways; it could be
exploited by an insider or external attacker, or it could be
sufficiently unusable that key stakeholders lose confidence
in its capabilities. By focusing on the different unintended
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consequences of a system, developers may be encouraged
to track problems back to their root causes. There is,
however, a need to see how security and usability con-
tribute to each other during system design activities.
This paper describes misusability cases: scenarios which
describe how design decisions may lead to usability
problems subsequently leading to system misuse. Section 2
describes the related work upon which our technique is
built. We present misusability cases in Sect. 3 together
with a validating example in Sect. 4. We conclude in
Sect. 5 by discussing how the findings from this work
further inform design approaches for usable and secure
systems.
2 Related work
2.1 Designing usable security
In their seminal paper on information security, Saltzer and
Schroeder [50] espouse several design principles for pro-
tection mechanisms. One of these is the principle of psy-
chological acceptability, which states: The interface to the
protection mechanism should be designed for ease of use,
so users routinely and automatically apply the mechanism
correctly. In recent years, there has been an enormous
amount of research in the area of HCI security; seminal
work in this area has looked at the usability of password
policies [1] and security controls [59]. The HCI security
community has considered the challenge of designing
usable security from two different standpoints: design
principles and user-centred security.
2.1.1 Design principles
The first standpoint is characterised by the application of
usable security design principles. Examples of these
include Yee’s design guidelines and strategies for secure
interaction [60]. These guidelines are written as principles
a designer should consider when making decisions about
secure interface design; examples include: Match the most
comfortable way to do tasks with the least granting of
authority, and Indicate clearly the consequences of deci-
sions that the user is expected to make. More recently,
attempts have been made to synthesise the many principles
that exist towards general guidelines for usable cyberse-
curity [48].
While the contributions of Yee and others are sensible
and well meaning, they are not the final word in designing
usability security as many of these principles and idioms
are also truisms. For example, [48] claims that Cyberse-
curity usability should be considered early on—it is hard to
imagine anyone advocating a contrary view. The need for
considering usability in security early on is not contested,
what is not so obvious is how security usability should be
considered and incorporated into a design or broader
intervention early and in such a way that it does not
interfere with productivity. Siponen [52] observes that the
main value of such ‘‘common sense principles’’ is to
change the conventional attitude that security is a human
rather than technical problem, rather than providing rig-
orous guidelines with empirical evidence to support their
suitability.
2.1.2 User-centred security and AEGIS
The second standpoint is characterised by Zurko and
Simon’s work on user-centred security [61]. User-centred
security refers to ‘‘security models, mechanisms, systems,
and software that have usability as a primary motivation
or goal’’. Zurko and Simon claim that secure systems
have, traditionally, been indifferent to the needs of
users—irrespective of whether these are end-users,
developers, or administrators. Like Yee [60], Zurko and
Simon argue for security models conducive to the mental
models of different types of users, but they also propose
synthesising security design techniques with established
design techniques from HCI. This work inspired, and
continues to inspire, much of the current research in
usable security. Surprisingly, the bulk of work in this
community focuses on studying the usability of security
controls rather than activities associated with designing
systems that are usable and secure. For example, a survey
by Birge [6] found that many HCI security papers are
divided into studies about usability testing on security
controls, mitigating security controls, conceptual investi-
gations about terms such as ‘‘trust’’ and ‘‘privacy’’,
experience studies about user attitudes, and models and
guidelines demonstrating trusted interactions and trusted
user interfaces. Birge also notes that much of this research
focuses on the needs of the end-user rather than the needs
of the designer, and few studies have attempted to tackle
the question about how designers should approach secu-
rity concerns.
Attempts to synthesise HCI and security techniques
continue to raise issues for researchers. To understand why,
we should consider one example of follow-on work: the
Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information
Security (AEGIS) design method [30]. AEGIS assumes
that secure systems are not merely software systems, but
socio-technical systems: systems of technology used within
a system of activity. To this end, AEGIS was designed as a
lightweight process which augments existing software
development methods that provide guidance to developers
for designing secure systems. This process is applied
within a focus group setting, where stakeholders gather,
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identify, and model the system’s assets in different con-
texts. These assets are evaluated according to values held
by the participants about them. Vulnerabilities, threats, and
risks affecting these assets are elicited, before possible
security controls mitigating these risks are selected. The
costs and benefits of situating these countermeasures for
each of the affected contexts is considered and, if unmiti-
gated risks remain, this process is repeated.
At a superficial level, AEGIS appeals to Zurko and
Simon’s canons for user-centred security. A more critical
analysis of AEGIS does, however, raise issues; these affect
not only AEGIS but the paradigm of user-centred security
in general.
First, AEGIS assumes that usability will follow by
taking a participative approach to design. However, work
by Irestig et al. [36] found that while participative practices
are effective for eliciting usage culture values that might
have otherwise remained tacit, resulting systems tend to be
comparatively chaotic, small-scale, and imbued with the
power relationships of the organisation.
Second, although conceptually simple, UML class dia-
grams (which are used in AEGIS to model assets) cannot
model alone the many elements which also impact secure
systems, such as goals, tasks carried out by users, and other
potentially relevant relationships, such as dependencies
between different users. Moreover, as analysis progresses,
models are likely to grow and become unwieldy without
dedicated tool-support.
Finally, although treating environments as first-class
modelling objects is an important step towards contextu-
alising risk analysis, workshops alone may not be enough
to elicit information about threats and vulnerabilities within
different environments. Although Zurko and Simon have
proposed applying techniques such as contextual inquiry
[35] to elicit such data, we are unaware of any peer-
reviewed literature which has attempted to do this in a
security context.
2.1.3 Evaluating the design of usable security
Some researchers in the security and HCI communities
have explored how evaluating the design of security might
lead to more usable security controls. For example, Jøsang
et al. [37] devised a selection of security usability vulner-
abilities associated with security tasks, and the assessment
of a systems security state. Such vulnerabilities can then be
compared with security solutions, and possibly combined
with relevant threat sources, to see where security might
fail. [37] also consider strategies for improving the security
and usability of security technologies. They accept that
interface changes alone may not be enough and entirely
new designs may be necessary to implement a usable
security design.
Jøsang and his colleagues suggest that re-designing a
security control with poor usability can be helped with
suitable usability metrics. Subsequent work by Braz et al.
[9] presented an approach where different steps of a task
scenario are associated with supplemental security prob-
lems, usability criteria, and a collection of usability factors
and metrics. This approach can be used by usability spe-
cialists and security designers to rate the impact of security
and usability issues associated with different aspects of a
particular task. This approach relies primarily on the
expertise of security and usability experts, so does not
require access to design models or systems stakeholders.
However, while this approach is useful for evaluating dif-
ferent aspects of a design, it remains primarily an evalua-
tion approach, with no guidance provided for a revising a
systems requirements based on the evaluation.
2.2 Addressing usable security with user-centred
design and requirements engineering
One proposal suggested by Zurko and Simon involves
synthesising security engineering practices with user-cen-
tred design. User-centred design is concerned with an early
focus on user goals and tasks, empirical measurement of
users, and iterative design [33]. Several user-centred design
techniques have also been usefully appropriated by
requirements engineering practitioners. Two of the most
prominent of these are personas and scenarios.
Personas are narrative descriptions of archetypical users
that embody their goals and needs [15]. Because they are
comparatively easy to develop and use, they are becoming
popular for summarising user research about prospective
system stakeholders [12]. Personas have also been proven
useful when engaging stakeholders in security [24]. The
activities necessary to create personas are also conducive to
a security analysis because in addition identifying affor-
dances for use, affordances for misuse and possible vul-
nerabilities can be identified at the same time [26].
Scenarios are stories about people carrying out an
activity [49]. Their allusory power has not been lost on the
requirements engineering community. They can be used to
impart knowledge about human activities at any level of
abstraction, provided the activities can be rendered in a
narrative structure. Consequently, scenarios are a universal
language in requirements engineering and can be used to
support the elicitation, specification, and validation of
requirements [3]. Sindre and Opdahl [51] have also pro-
posed using scenarios to describe unwanted behaviour in a
system. Such behaviour can be encapsulated in a misuse
case: a sequence of actions, including variants, that a
system or other entity can perform, interacting with mis-
users of the entity, and causing harm to some stakeholder/s
if the sequence is allowed to complete.
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While popular, user-centred approaches are not without
their flaws. From a security design perspective, it is
important to understand these weaknesses; these may lead
to the unintentional introduction of vulnerabilities into a
requirements specification.
First, user-centred approaches assume that usability
design should precede general system design. Cockton [14]
argues that invention will precede innovation, and while
concurrent design may be possible, an iterative design
process beginning with human factors work is an unreal-
istic aspiration.
Second, user-centred approaches may be implicitly
biased against software engineers. For example, Cooper
[15] argues that developers will, given the opportunity,
design any given software product for themselves, and that
many examples of bad usability can be attributed to soft-
ware developer indifference to usability. In particular,
Cooper’s argument is founded on the failure of a particular
Microsoft project described in [45], where a culture of
usability allegedly clashed with a culture of engineering.
However, an alternative reading of [45] also suggests that
poor requirements engineering practices on the part of the
usability designers and a failure to consistently respond to
developer requests for a working requirements specifica-
tion may have been as much to blame. Consequently, it is
equally possible that [45] strengthens, rather than rebuts,
Cockton’s more recent observations. A similar anti-engi-
neer bias has been observed by Thimbleby [55], who
claims that many usability professionals believe that
technologists are the origin of usability problems, and that
these problems can be solved by extolling the virtues of
user-centricity and acting as user proxies.
Third, user-centred approaches may, in some cases, be
methodologically weak. For example, Chapman and Mil-
ham [11] report little peer-reviewed discussion of the
Personas technique validity and, as a result, it may be
impossible to verify their accuracy. Moreover, because
personas are fictional representations, there is no easy way
to falsify them. Consequently, if a persona is developed
using questionable methods, or less than accurate empirical
data, it is difficult to disprove a persona’s validity.
Finally, knowing about usability problems is different
from being willing and able to fix them. Knowing that there
are usability problems is, however, important, but while
user-centred approaches are necessary and useful, they are
not in themselves sufficient. This is because user-centred
design techniques appear to focus solely on the world
external to the user interface without considering the use-
fulness of formal specifications for modelling complexity
and ambiguity; such specifications can, potentially, high-
light the causes of poor user interface design [56].
Sutcliffe [54] has compared and contrasted the traditions
in both HCI and software engineering concerning design
and its theoretical underpinnings. Sutcliffe concluded that
scenarios are indeed boundary objects between these dis-
ciplines, but that both occasionally carry out research
within each other’s bailiwick. In one sense, this might be
seen as competition, but it could also be viewed as con-
vergence between disciplines. Both disciplines do appear to
converge when dealing with interaction concerns, although
the viewpoints of each differ in both cases.
These different viewpoints suggest that care needs to be
taken when using scenarios to address concerns that cross-
cut these disciplinary perspectives, particularly when
security is involved. To see why, we should consider
Alexander’s proposed use of misuse cases for examining
usability issues [2]. Alexander presents an example where
confusion about the use of an interface causes a novice user
to become a negative agent. A corollary of this approach is
that the user is typecast as an attacker; this is analogous to
treating the user as the cause of poor interface design.
However, Brostoff and Sasse argue that this position is
tantamount to blaming users for a security design they
might compromise, and analogous to blaming the cause of
safety-critical system failures on human error rather than
bad design [10].
2.3 Aligning user-centred design with requirements
and security engineering using IRIS
Sutcliffe [54] claims that synthesis between different dis-
ciplinary design perspectives may be possible if instead of
focusing on heavyweight methods, a spectrum of comple-
mentary approaches is adopted. To explore this claim, our
research has examined how complementary user-centred
design practices can be integrated with both requirements
and security engineering. This work has led to the devel-
opment of the Integrating Requirements and Information
Security (IRIS) meta-model: a conceptual model for usable
secure requirements engineering [22]. The IRIS meta-
model extends existing work in user-centred design, secu-
rity and requirements engineering by including concepts
which allow the usability of tasks, and the usability of
impact of security design decisions to be modelled. The
IRIS meta-model extended related meta-models in security
requirements engineering, such as [29, 43, 44] to ensure re-
use of existing concepts, but was as parsimonious as pos-
sible when declaring model concepts, and model relation-
ships were simplified to make conceptual associations as
clear as possible. The meta-model itself sub-divided into
five views: task, goal, risk, responsibility, and environment.
Together, these views make it possible for security designs
to be assessed in different contexts of use.
The IRIS meta-model formed the basis of the IRIS
process framework, which guides technique selection when
specifying usable and secure systems [26]. The process
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framework is also complemented by the open-source
Computer Aided Integration of Requirements and Infor-
mation Security (CAIRIS) requirements management tool,
which demonstrates how model elements from security,
requirements, and usability engineering can be managed
and analysed [21].
Goals are a central feature of IRIS, and form the basis of
a specification that a particular system needs to satisfy. As
such, IRIS’ definition of goal, which is based on the defi-
nition used by the KAOS approach [39], is analogous to a
system goal. These goals are progressively refined, and leaf
goals become the responsibility of stakeholder roles; these
are responsible for ensuring the goal is satisfied. Goals can
be operationalised as tasks; these are scenarios exploring
the relationship between the specified system and the
intended users. These intended users are modelled as per-
sonas, which use the functionality specified by the system
goals to carry out activities of importance to them.
The same system goals facilitating these tasks can be
threatened using KAOS obstacles: conditions representing
undesired behaviour that prevent an associated goal from
being achieved [40]. Subsequent refinement of obstacles
may lead to the elicitation of vulnerabilities or possible
threats. When attackers carry out threats exploiting these
vulnerabilities, risks can be defined. Misuse cases act as a
validation of this risk analysis exercise. If a risk is valid,
then a believable misuse case should be written; this
describes how the attack associated with the risk exploits
the risk’s vulnerability to harm the endangered or exploited
assets.
Although user goals are not an explicit concept in IRIS,
subsequent work [20] has shown how the characteristics of
personas and the activities they engage in align with the i*
based goal-oriented requirements language (GRL) [4]. This
alignment makes it possible to generate GRL models based
on personas and use cases. With appropriate tool-support,
this may facilitate complementary analysis of trade-offs
arising from a reconfiguration of persona activities, goals,
and the dependencies between them [19]. Further explo-
ration of this alignment between IRIS and GRL is outside
the scope of this paper.
Although quantitative data analysis based on this meta-
model allows the impact of security decisions on the
usability of tasks to personas to be modelled, the only way
misusability can be explored is by treating personas as
attackers, or eliciting obstacles giving rise to secure mis-
usability. If we consider obstacles as exceptional behav-
iour, then use cases might form the basis of eliciting such
obstacles. Use cases are sequences of actions a system
performs yielding an observable result of value to a par-
ticular actor, i.e. someone or something outside the system
that interacts with the system [38]. These are synonymous
with scenarios and are a commonly used requirements
elicitation technique. Although they often describe the
normal course of an actor’s usage of a system, extensions
for exceptional behaviour can be associated with individual
steps [13]. Using this approach, accidental misuse of a
system can be elicited without typecasting a persona as an
attacker, but only if the requirements giving rise to the
misuse are known. It may be case that all we have are clues
to what this misuse might be. These might include possible
ambiguity in a specification, or some assumptions about a
persona’s behaviour that, in some cases, might cause cer-
tain types of behaviour.
2.4 Designing for the negative
To discover the contributing factors to inadvertent misuse
or abuse of a system, we must look beyond the classic view
of systems used precisely as their designers intended. An
example of such thinking is Dunne and Raby’s work on
Design Noir [18], which argues that our emotions and
needs are played out in technology across a much broader
spectrum of use originally envisaged by its designers.
Although previous work has considered the abuse and
misuse of social agents [8], Nathan et al.’s work on Value
Scenarios [46] is one of the few examples of work where
scenarios are used to describe both the positive and nega-
tive systematic effects of technology without considering
users as malevolent. Value scenarios are vignettes which
describe the systematic effects of a system to both direct
and indirect users over an extended period of time. These
scenarios describe the negative impact of forgetting about
certain values, such as prejudice and inequality.
Not all software systems are as divisive, pervasive, or
long-running as those typically described by value sce-
narios. Nevertheless, it may be possible to stimulate similar
narratives with more supplemental information about the
system, its users, and its contexts of use. This information
may not be available during the early stages of design
where it is envisaged that value scenarios should be
employed, but it might be available from the data collected
during later stages.
2.5 Bridging techniques with assumptions
The IRIS meta-model supports the KAOS concept of
domain properties to capture assumptions expected to hold
by the system, but it does not consider assumptions that
underpin the meta-model concepts themselves. Without a
specific means of associating these assumptions with
design, identifying the associations between misuse and the
system design decisions that contribute towards them
remains an ad hoc affair. Subsequent work [25] has,
however, examined how structured assumptions can be
used to better ground the construction of assumption
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personas. Building on Toulmin’s work on developing
practical arguments [57], we have illustrated how
assumptions can be structured and aligned with persona
characteristics. This work suggests that a characteristic is
analogous to a claim being made as part of an argument,
and a proposition reflecting an assumption about this
characteristic may act as evidence grounds, or a warrant: a
rule of inference describing how the grounds contribute to
the claim. The origin of a warrant’s assumption is the
backing knowledge for believing the claim, and assump-
tions may also be used as rebuttals, which challenge the
validity of the claim. Finally, a modal qualifier indicates
the degree of certainty about the claim. Our use of Toul-
min’s model of argumentation is inline with growing
security requirements engineering best practice for visual-
ising design rationale, e.g. [32, 34].
In a case study where personas were used to help elicit
secure system requirements [24], it was observed that the
contextual data used to elicit personas also inform the
elicitation of vulnerabilities. Based on the effectiveness of
the Toulmin model for grounding the characteristics of
personas, it may be possible to structure contextual data
suggesting possible system or user ambiguity in a similar
manner. Such characteristics may form the basis of estab-
lishing contexts where security misusability can occur.
3 Approach
Misusability cases, which were first proposed by [27], are
scenarios where a persona achieves a personal or work
objective, but inadvertently exploits one or more vulnera-
bilities in order to do so. Misusability cases have two
objectives. First, to identify cases of insecure misuse within
the context of use where activities are carried out using a
designed system. Second, to elicit the root causes of this
misuse, together with the system goals which mitigate
them.
As Fig. 1 illustrates, misusability cases do not exist in
isolation and are tightly integrated into the IRIS meta-
model. Before applying the technique, we assume system
goals have been elicited; these correspond to the require-
ments the systems needs to satisfy. We also assume that
one or more personas have also been elicited to reflect
different roles the system needs to be designed for. As the
figure also illustrates, some of these goals in this goal
model are operationalised as use cases. A misusability case
realises a use case describing a particular episode of system
behaviour carried out by an actor. Each actor associated
with the use case is realised by a persona.
Misusability cases are modelled using the IRIS concept
of task. The factors leading to this exploitation are myriad;
a user might accidentally circumvent application error
checking, misread software instructions, or carry out
behaviour that conflicts with organisational security poli-
cies. However, in all cases, these factors arise because of
vulnerabilities in the context of use within which the task
takes place.
To facilitate misusability cases within IRIS, two modest
changes were made to the task view of the IRIS meta-
model published in [22]; this revised model is presented in
Fig. 2.
The first change involved repurposing the changes made
to the IRIS meta-model in [25] for assumption personas to
also support misusability cases. These concepts are shown
on the left-hand side of Fig. 2. Characteristic was intro-
duced to describe a motivated characteristic of a persona.
These are, as indicated in Fig. 1, grounded in assumptions.
Fig. 1 Misusability case with other design concepts
Fig. 2 IRIS task meta-model updates for misusability cases
214 Requirements Eng (2016) 21:209–223
123
These assumptions are modelled as references (be these
grounds, warrants, or rebuttals), which were backed up
either by some externally documented artefact or by some
pre-existing security, usability, or requirements concept
within an IRIS model.
The second change involves introducing the concept of
use case to the meta-model, and the re-purposing of the
existing concept of role to encompass use case actors. Use
cases were not incorporated into the initial version of the
IRIS meta-model because, given the presence of the task
concept, use cases appeared to be superfluous when the
IRIS meta-model was validated in two initial industry case
studies (described in [22, 26]) where requirements were
elicited and specified. In these studies, however, the IRIS
process framework was used exclusively, i.e. there were no
constraints for the IRIS model to be interoperable with any
existing or planned design models. Given the ubiquity of
use cases for specifying, managing, and validating
requirements, not including this concept affects the sca-
leability of the IRIS meta-model. Moreover, pre-existing
use cases which are incomplete or ambiguously defined
may provide a useful source of misusability data. These
may be specified at an early stage of design, but not
updated as a design evolves, even though they may be used
as an authority when considering user needs.
In the following sections, we describe how misusability
cases are elicited and applied.
3.1 Eliciting misusability cases
The first step involves identifying implicit assumptions
being made about the design related to a use case. A variety
of techniques can be used to discover these assumptions.
When analysing documentation, such as architectural
design documents or user manuals, techniques proposed by
Dewar’s assumption-based planning methodology [17] are
particularly useful. These techniques include using jour-
nalist questions (Who? What? When? Where? Why?, and
How?) about items of data, and looking for instances of
text where the words will and must are used.
Using the conceptual model described by Fig. 2, refer-
ences are created for each assumption. Each reference
contains a statement summarising the assumption, a link to
the source material, together with an excerpt from the
source material justifying the assumption. References may
also be elicited from design artefacts, such as personas.
Once a collection of references have been elicited, the
characteristics of a convincing misusability case are
developed. The process for developing misusability case
characteristics are analogous to those used for developing
persona characteristics. A claim is made about some
characteristic of the system which might be liable for
misuse. The references are used to act as grounds or a
warrant to this claim or, if necessary, a rebuttal. Finally, a
modal qualifier is associated with the characteristic based
on the analyst’s confidence in the claim.
The final stage involves writing a supporting task sat-
isfying these characteristics while, simultaneously, carry-
ing out the steps within the use case. Enacting the task is
the persona fulfilling the use case actor’s role. The
behaviour exhibited by the persona should be commensu-
rate with the characteristics built into the task; if the
characteristics of the misusability case as such that they
conflict with the persona’s objectives then this should be
reflected in the task narrative.
3.2 Applying misusability cases
The next stage involves identifying the obstacles directly
contributing to the different aspects of misusability in the
misusability case. Based on these obstacles, the higher-
level obstacles these lower-level obstacles help satisfy are
elicited. This step continues until system goals are identi-
fied, or new goals are elicited, which are obstructed by
these obstacles. Although this step could be construed as an
exercise in bottom-up analysis, fitting the misusability case
and its contributing obstacles into the larger goal model
necessitates both top-down and bottom-up analysis.
Once the misusability case has been reconciled with
the system goal model then one of two actions may be
possible. Eliciting both the misusability case and con-
tributing obstacles may have provided insights suggesting
new goals to resolve the obstacles identified. If this is the
case then these are added to the goal model. Alterna-
tively, it may not be possible to mitigate the elicited
obstacles because further investigation into the problem
domain is needed, or the controls needed to mitigate the
obstacles are out of scope. In such cases, the obstacles are
assigned to a particular role. This role is responsible for
further analysis leading to eventual mitigation of the
obstacle. Explicitly assigning the obstacle to a role miti-
gates the possibility of diffusion of responsibility, where
unresolved problems are ignored because no single agent
is responsible for them [16].
4 Misusability cases in practice
We now provide an example of how misusability cases
were used in a project to develop a portal for sharing
medical study data [42]. The portal was primarily designed
to serve two particular user communities: academic
researchers and data managers. Academic researchers use
the portal and its resources to find re-usable data sources,
and contribute to the portal’s documentation server and
portal. Data managers work within particular study units
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and are responsible for curating study data, its meta-data,
and making authorised study data available on the portal.
To support portal development, we elicited additional
security requirements for the portal’s meta-data repository
(MDR): a database allowing researchers to discover meta-
data about different studies. Ideally, both security and
usability should be designed into a system at a very early
stage. Our involvement with the project commenced not at
its initial inception, but once the main architecture and
component sub-systems had been outlined. Moreover,
despite the fact that contact and engagement from repre-
sentative stakeholders could have made an invaluable
contribution to our work, the project scope was such that
data could not be collected from prospective researchers or
data managers. It was, therefore, necessary to use the portal
development team, who had spent considerable time
working with the different user communities, as proxy
users. We also attempted to make best use of the available
project documentation. This documentation included
requirements specification that was developed for the
portal at the very early stages of the project. These
requirements were elicited by a team of analysts with
access to representative data managers. The analysts elic-
ited a collection of ten scenarios illustrating how
researchers and data managers might use the portal and, on
the basis of these, 70 functional and non-functional
requirements were derived. These non-functional require-
ments included 11 security requirements which, with two
exceptions, were exclusively concerned with access control
of the MDR data. This bias for access control and confi-
dentiality is understandable; the nature of the project was
such that certain aspects of meta-data were sensitive and
likely to be harmful to study participants if disclosed.
4.1 Methods
The process for eliciting the additional security require-
ments for the MDR, which the creation and application of
misusability cases was part of, is illustrated in Fig. 3 and
detailed in the sub-sections below.
4.1.1 Persona development and scoping
While the project team’s responsibility formed a natural
scope of analysis around the MDR, there was concern
that security issues might cross-cut organisational
boundaries; such issues may be the responsibility of one
team, but the adverse impact could affect others. It was
also necessary to understand the different expectations
held about the prospective MDR user-community. To
deal with both of these issues, it was decided to identify
implicit assumptions in the available documentation, and
use these to form the basis of assumption personas. In
doing so, the expectations about end-users are made
explicit, and subsequent discussion around these confirm
a useful boundary for the analysis to be carried out in
later stages.
For each role relevant to the scope of analysis, the
available documentation was reviewed to elicit references
for each role. These are used to establish persona charac-
teristics and, based on these, assumption personas. The
process for eliciting these assumption personas is described
in more detail in [25].
Once the assumption personas were developed, these
were presented to the project team for review. Issues raised
by the team were used to revise the assumption personas or
correct any misinterpretations held about the MDR.
4.1.2 Design sessions
By carrying out this intervention in parallel with on-going
project activity, using participative design sessions alone
was infeasible. Conversely, however, limited documenta-
tion artefacts meant that group-based design sessions
would be required to elicit the data contributing to the
requisite IRIS concepts.
The design sessions stage entailed holding small focus
groups with project team members. Each session focused
on the use of activity scenarios, KAOS, or AEGIS. An
activity scenario session involved modelling scenarios
carried out by the elicited assumption personas in their
respective contexts. A KAOS session involved eliciting
goals needing to be satisfied to enable the elicited scenarios
to be realised. In both session types, assumption personas
were used as an authority for user expectations; these were
modified if aspects of the analysis challenge their charac-
teristics. AEGIS sessions involved carrying out asset
modelling for the different environments, and discussing
possible attackers, threats and vulnerabilities that might
arise due to environmental factors; based on these, several
risks were identified.Fig. 3 Instantiated process for the MDR specification
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Each design session was recorded and, following each
session, the transcripts were analysed to elicit additional
information about the scenarios, goals, and asset models
elicited.
After the final session, each goal was examined and
assigned a responsible role. Following this, a specification
document was generated and sent to the project team
members for review.
4.1.3 Misusability analysis
In order to help make assumptions more transparent and,
simultaneously, help inform system usability and security
using the work of the project team, a misusability analysis
phase was appended to this process.
Using both previously analysed and new documentation
produced by the project team, assumptions were identified
leading to the elicitation of misusability cases. These
artefacts were used to elicit contributing obstacles, together
with the goals these obstacles obstruct. This activity
stimulated innovative thinking about new goals for
resolving these obstacles.
Elicited goals were refined to requirements and assigned
a responsible role. Following this, a revised specification
document was generated and sent to the project team
members for review. Once the team was given sufficient
time to review the analysis, a final wrap-up session was
held where the final results were presented.
4.2 Results
The available project documentation was analysed to
identify assumptions and, based on these, assumption
personas for a researcher (Alex) and a data manager
(Brian) were elicited.
Four in-situ design sessions were held with project team
members; each session lasted between 40 min and 1 h.
During each session, 1–2 developers worked with the pri-
mary author to elicit the use cases and tasks carried out by
the personas, together with the goals that the portal would
need to satisfy to support them. These sessions were sup-
ported by CAIRIS, which was used to manage the design
data and evolve the system goal model as the sessions
progressed. After the final design session, a requirement
specification was generated by CAIRIS, and sent to the
project team members for review.
Once it had been established that there were no issues
with the analysis carried out to date, the goal model and
related design artefacts, together with the project docu-
mentation were used as data sources for misusability case
elicitation and mitigation. CAIRIS was also used to store
elicited references, characteristics, misusability cases, and
the obstacles and goals elicited on the basis of this addi-
tional analysis.
After the misusability cases had been elicited, and the
final wrap-up session was held, a total of 42 requirements
and 21 obstacles had been elicited. Of these 21 obstacles,
15 were elicited using misusability cases. Of the 42
requirements elicited, twice as many security requirements
(22) were elicited using this process than were specified in
the original portal requirements specification.
In the following sections, we describe an example of
how one of these misusability cases was elicited and used
during this study.
4.3 Developing the misusability case
To identify the functionality associated with importing
study meta-data into the MDR, the following use case,
batch import meta-data, was specified.
The data manager completes the fields of a mapping file
and, from his web-browser, enters a URI to the meta-data
upload page. When the upload page is displayed, the data
manager enters the location of the mapping file and clicks
on the Upload button. The system uploads the meta-data to
the MDR based on the data in the mapping file and, after
several minutes, acknowledges the successful import of the
meta-data to the data manager.
The mapping file describes properties of the meta-data,
such as the file names, locations, and security policies
associated with the meta-data. Associated with this use
case was a pre-condition that the meta-data itself has been
prepared and ready for import.
While the use case suggests little to form the basis of
security misuse, a number of clues were found in related
artefacts. The MDR implementation guide suggested that
utilities to support data managers in preparing their meta-
data may be made available via a central repository on the
portal. This central repository also hosted forums and best
practice documentation about how to make best use of the
portal. Other clues were found in the related persona
description. Brian was found to irregularly use the portal
and, because of his unfamiliarity with the mechanics of
sharing data outside of his study unit, is unfamiliar with the
process of importing data to the MDR. Consequently, a
lack of documentation and best practice was likely to be a
cause of frustration. We also know that Brian was adept at
scripting, and was likely to script the process of satisfying
the use case preconditions.
These assumptions were recorded as references and,
using the argumentation structure described in Sect. 3.1,
characteristics were elicited that unpinned a misusability
case undermining the use case; this argumentation structure
generated by CAIRIS is illustrated in Fig. 4. Using these
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characteristics as guidance, the batch import sensitive
meta-data misusability case was written:
Brian had spent most of the morning preparing data-sets
ready for export to various sources. Some of the meta-data
was for deep [sensitive] meta-data for local databases,
while others were shallow [summarised] meta-data tar-
geted for the MDR. He hoped to use standards and
guidelines on the gateway, but he was disappointed by the
lack of anything useful that would help him. Nevertheless,
Brian managed to organise his meta-data into the layout he
inferred from some XSLT scripts he was able download.
After finally finishing the preparation of his data-sets and
meta-data, Brian created the mapping files needed for the
data import process. Fortunately, most of them were very
similar so most of the files he used were based on an initial
template he created for one of his data-sets. Brian entered
a URI he had been provided for uploading meta-data to the
MDR, and logged in using his Data Manager credentials.
Brian then specified the mapping file corresponding to the
meta-data he wanted to upload and hit the Upload button.
Several minutes after clicking the Upload button, Brian
received a message from the portal indicating that the
meta-data had been uploaded.
Although not written into the misusability case itself,
Brian has inadvertently uploaded a mapping file for public
meta-data, which points to sensitive and private meta-data.
As a result, unauthorised meta-data had been made publicly
available on the portal.
4.4 Mitigating the misusability case
Figure 5 presents an excerpt from the goal model generated
by CAIRIS that is associated with the aforementioned
misusability case; this misusability case is represented by
the dark blue ellipse at the bottom of the figure. The colour
of this figure is based on how usable Brian finds the
activities described in this task; the darker the shade of
blue, the less usable the task is. Further explanation of how
the usability of tasks are calculated is outside the scope of
this paper, but is detailed in [23].
As the figure illustrates, we identified three contributing
obstacles which cause the misusability case to be realised.
In this figure, obstacles are modelled as yellow rhomboids.
The first of these obstacles is the lack of documentation
about the import layout. If we consider possible root
obstacles, then we discover that satisfying this obstacle
contributes to an obstacle of the MDR documentation
being unavailable. One reason that this documentation is
unavailable is because no one is explicitly responsible for
publishing anything. We can, therefore, mitigate this first
obstacle by specifying a goal (layout documentation) stat-
ing that the expected data layout shall be published when
an import tool is made available to data managers.
The second obstacle points to a lack of contributed best
practice documentation. The frustration caused by this, like
the first obstacle, lengthened the time taken to complete the
activity; this possibly increased the likelihood of the slip
occurring during the misusability case; this slip was
reflected by the inadvertent specification of the mapping
file data policy as public. Although the management of
portal documentation was largely de-scoped from this
analysis, the impact of the obstacle affects the MDR. For
this reason, the obstacle was assigned to the portal
administrators to ensure it is addressed by the portal design
team.
The third obstacle relates to the upload of the inappro-
priate meta-data to the MDR due to mis-specification of the
mapping file template. The obstacle states the sensitive
meta-data was specified as publicly accessible. This
obstacle is too granular to immediately suggest a mitigating
Fig. 4 Characteristics and argumentation structure underpinning a misusability case
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goal, thereby requiring further thought about root obstacles
this might be satisfying. Because the obstacles are based on
system rather than user errors, it would be inappropriate to
define the immediate parent obstacle as a slip on the part of
Brian. However, the consequences of the slip suggest that
some form of validation safeguarding against such slips
might have failed. A root obstacle that might be satisfied by
the contributing obstacles states that the batch import
process failed to spot the validation error. Yet, this obstacle
raises the question: What such a validation error might
entail? One means of providing this validation involves
stating a priori expectations about the data manager’s
study unit’s policy for exporting different classes of data
and meta-data. By consulting these expectations, discrep-
ancies between unit data and the unit data policies can be
highlighted during a pre-import validation check. To
realise these requirements, two goals were added to the
goal model. The first of these stipulates that a mapping file
validation check shall be carried out in order to satisfy the
goal of batch importing meta-data into the MDR. The
second goal resolves the meta-data policy mis-specified
obstacle; this involves stating that study policy expectation
check shall be carried out as part of the validation process.
5 Discussion
5.1 Pairing for engagement
One of the benefits of the misusability case technique was
its ability to increase developer engagement towards
understanding how poor usability can both hinder take-up
Fig. 5 Misusability case contribution to goal model
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of the system they were trying to build, and compromise
security. This engagement led developers to consider
security issues they might have otherwise considered out-
of-scope, and the responsibility of another team.
The misusability case below, which is similar to that
described in Sect. 4.3, was developed to explore the impact
of corrupt meta-data causing the import process to misin-
terpret the quality of study data.
Brian has been preparing data-sets ready for ingestion
into the MDR. He hoped to use standards and guidelines on
the portal, but he was disappointed by the lack of anything
useful that would help him. Sill, Brian managed to organise
his meta-data into the layout he inferred from some the
XSLT scripts he downloaded.
Unfortunately, in some cases, some of the meta-data
came from MS Office files and a few invisible character
codes managed to find their way into the prepared meta-
data files. Fortunately, Brian thinks he managed to catch
most of them before he finally collated a meta-data file
ready for upload.
Brian entered a URI he had been provided for uploading
his meta-data and, after logging in using the Data Man-
ager credentials, Brian enters an online form describing
some of the characteristics of the meta-data, together with
the location on his PC where meta-data can be found.
Several minutes after Brian clicked on the Upload button,
Brian received a message from the gateway saying the
meta-data had been uploaded.
Consequently, although draft data was imported into the
MDR, this was interpreted as real study data. When this
misusability case was presented to developers, together
with goals which would mitigate this problem, the devel-
opers were adamant that the obstacle should not be miti-
gated. Doing so, they argued, might disengage data
managers; the developers did not want to pre-empt what
data managers should or should not wish to import into the
MDR.
Following this discussion, a second, consequential,
misusability case (below) was presented to the developers.
Alex is currently sat in his office, in front of Safari. Alex
is currently trying to add substance to an unfinished paper
about the time parents spend with their sons in South
Africa.
Alex has come across a paper in PubMed, which points
to a particular data-set. This dataset is referenced in the
paper as a URI. Alex clicks on the URI, which takes him
into the portal The publicly available data about the
dataset is loaded into the browser. This data includes a
thumbnails of the questions being asked, and some statis-
tics on who the question was asked to, i.e. the number of
responses, together with the mean or variance. Unfortu-
nately, the metadata about the data quality meta-data has
been corrupt, which means that he fails to spot the lack of
quality information for the data set. There are, however,
links about the study which produced the data-set, and
links to a PDF version of the question it came from.
This data-set isn’t precisely what Alex is looking for, but
it is similar. As a result, Alex decides to look at the study in
more detail. He clicks on the details of the study to find out
more about the characteristics of the population and who
the study is funded by. After looking at these details, Alex
bookmarks the study URI for future reference.
Later, Alex will obtain this dataset and notice enough
similarities in his research that elements of the data will be
applicable to his study.
This misusability case was a corollary of the first and
described the impact of the corrupt data from Alex’s per-
spective. In this misusability case, the invisible control
characters in the imported meta-data caused the portal to
leave the quality indicator field blank when information
about a study is viewed by an end-user. As a result, Alex
obtained the data and used it in his own research without
realising that it wasn’t real.
After this second misusability cases were presented, the
developers acknowledged the seriousness of the MRD
contributing to the publication of research grounded in
invalid scientific data. The developers did not have an
immediate solution to this problem, but they did identify
additional usability concerns that Brian might have, and
they acknowledged that Brian would only use the portal if
it was seamlessly integrated into their work processes.
Although the system documentation does not specifically
allude to draft data being uploaded to the MDR, encour-
aging data managers to use the portal would require further
thought about how synthetic data could be imported, and
distinguished from actual study data.
5.2 Scope and responsibility
The misusability case example illustrated how security
issues can lead to a scope of analysis review. During earlier
design sessions, documentation related goals and assets
were deemed to be out of scope for the MDR. As such, they
were removed from the analysis data altogether. However,
in hindsight, it was necessary for such goals to be present;
this included making explicit who was responsible for
ensuring their satisfaction, and how these goals could
impact goals and obstacles which were within scope.
The example also highlighted the importance of ensur-
ing that unresolved obstacles were also assigned to
responsible agents. Previous work in Responsibility Mod-
elling has considered roles held by responsible agents
towards securing systems, and modelling responsibility
relationships between these agents, e.g. [5, 7]. Despite a
comparatively recent resurgence of interest in the role of
responsibility modelling to elicit requirements during the
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early stages of design [19, 53], vulnerabilities are still
considered a consequence of responsibility failure, rather
than something which can be brought to account. Although
risk management approaches deal with the idea of trans-
ferring unmitigated responses to one or more agents, we
believe that assigning ownership of obstacles during the
early stages of design will ensure that vulnerabilities giving
rise to security and usability problems are promptly
addressed. This entails making the assigned stakeholders
liable for addressing the obstacle. Flechais and Sasse [31]
argue that this motivates the assigned stakeholders. This is
because failure to act responsibly damages both the pro-
ject’s assets and its reputation; this reputation loss may lead
to loss of trust in the whole system.
5.3 Misusability as an innovation tool
Another benefit of explicitly introducing the concept of
misusability into design are the opportunities afforded for
innovation. Ensuring sensitive data was not offered to an
external interface was raised as a concern in the MDR
requirements specification, but much of the focus on
security within the design itself was focused on providing
identity assurance. The misusability case example in
Sect. 4 led to the un-envisaged leverage of different types
of access control policies to help safeguard against the
disclosure of sensitive data.
Scenarios have already been proposed as a vehicle for
stimulating innovation [41]; by viewing technology from the
perspective of marginal communities, a fresh perspective
can be obtained which lead to innovative ideas. In misus-
ability cases, rather than looking at marginal communities,
we instead consider how marginalised personas are affected
by design ambiguity. Like the transfer scenarios described
by [41], misusability case narratives are grounded in data,
but are also supplemented with goal-oriented techniques
from requirements engineering to show how a system design
contributes to misusability. Rather than treating misusability
ephemerally, perhaps we should use also misusability cases
as a grounded innovation technique?
5.4 Limitations of approach
Although we have validated Misusability Cases using a
real case study example, two limitations of this approach
are worth highlighting.
First, the analyst applying this approach in the case
study example was one of the paper authors. Although this
author has several years of industry experience in software
engineering, which includes the elicitation, specification,
and validation of software requirements, he also possesses
broader usability and security engineering expertise. While
such expertise would not typically be available to a single
practitioner, there is, as Sect. 2.2 highlights, a growing
body of work that aligns both user-centred design and
security with general requirements engineering practice. As
a result, the requisite tools and techniques underpinning
misusability cases are accessible to the practitioner com-
munity. For example, misusability cases were used by the
EU FP 7 webinos project to re-evaluate software require-
ments from a usability security perspective [58]. A team of
ten practitioners and researchers (including the paper
authors) elicited 5 misusability cases. The methodology
described in this paper was broadly followed, but while
design consequences of the misusability cases are pre-
sented, no requirements were explicitly updated as a result.
Second, several goals were elicited for mitigating the
misusability cases in the study described in Sect. 4, the
security impact of these mitigating goals were not con-
sidered. This is because the scope of investigation was to
elicit and specify additional security requirements. It was
then left to the developers to decide whether or not to
realise these requirements. However, if the development
team had decided to realise these requirements, KAOS
could have been used to elicit and specify further goals and
obstacles based on these, which could be complemented by
an architectural risk analysis using CAIRIS. Such an
approach is demonstrated by [28].
6 Conclusion
Scenarios have been used to support both security and
usability engineering. To date, there is little evidence that
scenarios used to support design in one context informs
design activities in another. In this paper, we have descri-
bed misusability cases which, rather than treating misus-
ability as a corollary of bad design, explicitly identifies the
causes of misusability and inform the design of systems to
resolve them. In doing so, we demonstrate how a particular
scenario can support both security and usability design
activities.
Our work makes four specific contributions towards
addressing misusability in secure systems. First, we
describe how existing work in usability and security
engineering can be aligned to form the basis of eliciting
usable security requirements engineering concerns, and
why simply typecasting users as attackers may be less
effective than modelling both the impact of misusability in
users’ activities, and their causes. Second, we illustrate
how assumptions identified using existing user-centred
design and requirements engineering techniques can be
modelled using argumentation models, the elements of
which help identify examples of unintentional misuse.
Third, we present a case for explicitly assigning responsi-
bility for the causes of misusability leading to system
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misuse irrespective of whether or not discharging this
responsibility is within the scope of analysis or not. Finally,
we describe how misusability cases can benefit design
activities by re-sensitising developers with usability con-
cerns, and stimulating innovative thinking towards hitherto
unidentified design requirements fostering both security
and usability.
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